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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

diplomatic burden to Britain., and., anxious to appease Moscow, she was
ready to agree to its transfer to Soviet command. Since the war was still
in progress,, the Polish Army was of a certain value to the British at the
time and it can be judged how great must have been the pressure Russia
exerted on London^ if one of the leaders of Britain was reduced to saying
angrily to the Polish Prime Minister when they had both been in Moscow
together in that October, " Your Army I Your Air Force ! Your Navy i
You can take them., we don't need them any more."
This idea of the creation of a united Polish Government with the aid
of the participation of some sponsored committee, was the normal means
by which Moscow sought to disrupt any political organisation by riding
the Trojan horse of Communism.   This method had been employed by
the Comintern a few years before the war when they heralded the People's
Front,, and proved eminently successful in Spain and France., and it had
also been applied at the appropriate stages during the destruction of the
Baltic States.   Now this idea instigated by Moscow was acclaimed by
Winston S. Churchill as the remede extraordinaire for the Polish question,
although there was not one political party in Poland willing to agree with
this solution.   Mikolajczyk, in his Memorandum of August, 1944, had
visualised the possibility of allotting one-fifth of the seats in the new
Cabinet (which would have to be created in Warsaw until the elections
could be held) to the Communists.   This concession, however, met with
no support among the Poles, and there was a general sharp criticism that
Mikolajczyk had over-stepped his rights.     On the other hand, it was
worthless to Moscow, who had previously demanded fifteen seats for their
stooges and indicated those Poles in London who were to be nominated as
the three members of this new Cabinet.   At this stage, however, they were
no longer eager to pursue the topic of any united government, well aware
that the British Government would agree with any solution they chose to
forward.   And the British Premier in supporting Moscow's claims, was
also folly aware that the Polish people would not tolerate any Soviet-
sponsored Committee as their government, nor any government in which
members of this * Committee,' the highly specialised Russian Comintern
officials and professional makers of revolution, would participate.
Outside Poland there were only two centres where the Poles could freely
express their views, namely, in the United States and amongst the Polish
Army in Great Britain, since military censorship was not concerned
with the political expressions of the soldiers.* The Polish Army constituted
ninety-two per cent, of the Polish population within the British sphere,
and the voice of these soldiers could be classified as the real expression of
* As has been related,, the Polish Press and public opinion had effectively been
muzzled by the limitations of the paper supply under the rules of the established
Paper Control, and* in drastic cases, at the demand of the Soviet Embassy, by
the suppression of certain out-spoken Polish newspapers.
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